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Abstract. Seven decades of extractions have dramatically
reduced Jordan River ﬂows, lowered the Dead Sea level,
opened sink holes, and caused other environmental prob-
lems. The ﬁx Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinians propose
would build an expensive multipurpose conveyance project
from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea that would also gen-
erate hydropower and desalinate water. This paper com-
pares the Red-Dead project to alternatives that may also
raise the Dead Sea level. Hydro-economic model results for
the Jordan-Israel-Palestinian inter-tied water systems show
two restoration alternatives are more economically viable
than the proposed Red-Dead project. Many decentralized
newsupply, wastewaterreuse, conveyance, conservation, and
leak reduction projects and programs in each country can
together increase economic beneﬁts and reliably deliver up
to 900MCMyr−1 to the Dead Sea. Similarly, a smaller
Red-Deadprojectthatonlygenerateshydropowercandeliver
large ﬂows to the Dead Sea when the sale price of generated
electricity is sufﬁciently high. However, for all restoration
options, net beneﬁts fall and water scarcity rises as ﬂows to
the Dead Sea increase. This ﬁnding suggests (i) each country
has no individual incentive to return water to the Dead Sea,
and (ii) outside institutions that seek to raise the Dead must
also offer countries direct incentives to deliver water to the
Sea besides building the countries new infrastructure.
1 Introduction
The Jordan River basin states have long faced water scarcity
with plans, proposed allocations, diversions, reservoirs, and
treaties to address scarcity dating back a century and longer
(Beaumont, 1997; Lowi, 1993; Wolf, 1995). As a result
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just 100million cubic meters per year (MCMyr−1) of the
1000+MCMyr−1 that historically ﬂowed in the lower Jor-
dan River now reach the river’s outlet at the Dead Sea (Beau-
mont, 1997; Raz, 2009; Yechieli et al., 1998). The Dead Sea
level has fallen – 30m since 1960 and 1.2m in 2009 alone –
withdeclinescausinglandsubsidence, sinkholes, groundwa-
ter contamination, reduced mineral extraction and tourism,
plus other problems (Asmar and Ergenzinger, 2002;Glau-
siusz, 2010; Lensky et al., 2005; Yechieli et al., 1998;
Salameh and El-Naser, 2008).
In response, Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinians seek to
build a 180km conveyance project from the Red Sea at
Aqaba north to the Dead Sea (Glausiusz, 2010; Hussein,
2007). This Red-Dead project would use a 400m elevation
drop to generate hydropower, desalinate some conveyed wa-
ter, dump brine waste into the Dead Sea to restore the lake
level, and pump desalinated water 1000m up to major urban
areas in Jordan and possibly Palestine and Israel.
Although estimates exist of Israeli, Jordanian, and Pales-
tinian willingness-to-pay to restore the Dead Sea (Becker
and Katz, 2009), system-wide beneﬁts and impacts of the
Red-Dead project and alternatives have not been quanti-
ﬁed (Arbitbol, 2006). Further, the project requires at least
$US5billion in donor funds (Glausiusz, 2010; Hussein,
2007) and the World Bank is now assessing the project for
environmental, social, and economic feasibility (2010). The
Bank’s assessment will focus on different Red-Dead project
alignments(2010)ratherthanalternativeinfrastructure, oper-
ations, or governance to “raise the Dead” Sea level. Potential
alternatives could include:
– each country cuts back water use by its agricultural
users in the Jordan Valley,
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– release more freshwater from the Sea of Galilee (Lake
Kinneret, Tiberias), dams on the Yarmouk, and other
tributaries,
– release more freshwater from the Galilee and substitute
foregone water with water desalinated on the Mediter-
ranean seacoast, or
– build decentralized new water supply, wastewater treat-
ment and reuse projects plus implement targeted water
conservation and leak reduction programs to allow each
country to forgo or substitute use of Jordan River water.
Here, I (i) identify hydrologic and economic impacts of
the Red-Dead project and alternatives, (ii) quantify impacts
among countries and as a function of the ﬂow delivered to
the Dead Sea, and (iii) suggest governance for viable ap-
proaches. To do this I extend the hydro-economic Water
Allocation System (WAS) model for Israel, Palestine, and
Jordan (Fisher et al., 2005; Rosenberg et al., 2008) to include
and allow return ﬂows from agriculture, brine waste from de-
salination, multiple water quality types to meet a minimum
in-stream ﬂow requirement, and ﬁxed-increment infrastruc-
ture capacity expansions. These extensions represent impor-
tant components of the ﬂow balance for the Dead Sea, ﬂow
requirementstorestoretheDeadSealevel, andlimitstobuild
large infrastructure such as the Red-Dead project. They are
needed to quantify impacts both of restoration alternatives
and as a function of ﬂow delivered to the Dead Sea. Sec-
tions 2 and 3 overview the hydro-economic modelling ap-
proach and describe model extensions. Subsequent sections
present updated model data for the three countries, model re-
sults, and implications for governance. Section 7 concludes.
2 Hydro-economic modelling approach
Hydro-economic models have seen wide use by academics
for over 4 decades (Howe and Linaweaver, 1967; Milliman,
1963; Harou et al., 2009) and are suited to assess local
and regional water management activities because they can
mathematically integrate into a single coherent framework
the spatially distributed and disaggregated hydrologic, engi-
neering, economic, environmental, operations, and policy as-
pects of complex water systems (Harou et al., 2009). Hydro-
logic water balance components such as river ﬂows, evapora-
tion, natural groundwater recharge and discharge, and return
ﬂows combine with relevant engineered diversions, reser-
voirs, pipelines, canals, well ﬁelds, desalination, wastewater
treatment plants, and other components to form a node-link
network. Costs are speciﬁed for ﬂows along links or other
water provision, treatment, and disposal activities at nodes.
Economic demands such as urban, industrial, and agricul-
turalusesarelocatedatnodesanddescribedbydemandfunc-
tions that express the value or beneﬁts derived from the water
volume delivered.
A central hydro-economic model concept is that water de-
mands are not ﬁxed delivery requirements but rather func-
tions where volumes of water use at different times and
places have varying total and marginal economic values
(Harou et al., 2009). The model identiﬁes water allocations
to nodes and through links that maximize system-wide net
beneﬁts with net beneﬁts quantiﬁed as the area between the
demand and cost curves. Allocations are subject to physical,
hydrologic, engineering, operational, and policy constraints
and limits.
Models include environmental water uses – such as ﬂow
to the Dead Sea – in two ways. Where possible, models
quantifyenvironmentaldemandcurvesusingrevealedprefer-
ence, travel cost, hedonic pricings, stated preference, or other
econometric estimation methods (Young, 2005). Then, they
locate demand curves at model nodes like other economic
demands. This ﬁrst approach is often only partial and con-
troversial (Becker and Katz, 2009; Young, 2005). A second
approach, adopted here, instead speciﬁes environmental wa-
ter use as a constraint on ﬂow at a model node or along a link.
Then (i) change the constraint level through sensitivity anal-
ysis, or (ii) examine the shadow value associated with the
constraint to identify the opportunity cost of environmental
water(Harou et al., 2009). Shadow values (Lagrange mul-
tipliers; dual variables) are model outputs and specify how
system-wide net beneﬁts change where the constraint was re-
laxed by one unit (such as 1m3).
This second approach to environmental water use parallels
other constraint-based methods to represent operating rules,
policies, or proscribe delivery requirements to certain nodes
or demand sectors. Thus, the hydro-economic model does
not make water policy nor recommend environmental water
use levels; rather, it identiﬁes water allocations that perfectly
obey imposed policies and environmental uses and reports
resulting hydrologic, economic, and other impacts.
3 WAS model and extensions
The hydro-economic WAS model is a steady-state, nonlin-
ear optimization program that identiﬁes withdrawals from
sources, deliveries through conveyance links between dis-
tricts, and allocations to water use sectors within districts
that maximize regional net beneﬁts (Fisher et al., 2005). The
single-year version for Israel, Jordan, and Palestine includes
demands of 17.4million people in urban, industrial, and agri-
cultural sectors spread across 45 districts, 109 links, and
91 supply sources (Fig. 1), fresh and recycled water quali-
ties, and country-speciﬁc price policies (Fisher et al., 2005).
A stochastic version adds hydrologic variability, leak reduc-
tion, water conservation programs, plus conveyance, recy-
cling, desalination, and source capacity expansion decisions
(Rosenberg et al., 2008). The stochastic version has as an
objective function to maximize expected regional net ben-
eﬁts. Expected net beneﬁts are net beneﬁts in each water
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Fig. 1. Schematic of the existing inter-tied water systems for Israel, Palestine, and Jordan used in the extended Water Allocation System
model. Urban, industrial, and agricultural water demands are located at districts while nodes represent intermediary points to transfer
freshwater, recycled water, or agricultural return ﬂows that are naturally or artiﬁcially conveyed along links.
availability event weighted by the event probability (likeli-
hood). Expected net beneﬁts include expected beneﬁts from
all agricultural, municipal, and industrial water uses mi-
nus expected withdrawal, treatment, conveyance, wastewater
treatment, and other operational costs and minus one-time
capital costs for infrastructure expansions and conservation
program developments.
The work here extends the single-year and stochastic
versions to include and allow return ﬂows from agricul-
ture, brine waste from desalination, multiple water quality
types to meet a minimum in-stream ﬂow requirement, and
ﬁxed-increment infrastructure capacity expansions. These
extensions represent important components of ﬂow balance
for the Dead Sea, ﬂow requirements to restore the Dead
Sea level, and limits to build large infrastructure such as the
Red-Dead projects. These extensions help assess Dead Sea
restoration alternatives, are implemented as one or more new
optimization program constraint(s), and are discussed further
below.
3.1 Return ﬂows from agriculture
In the single-year and stochastic versions of WAS, agricul-
tural wastewater (return ﬂow) cannot be reused, is assumed
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to have no economic value, and is not considered or quan-
tiﬁed. However, agriculture wastewater is currently a large
component of lower Jordan River ﬂows and Dead Sea in-
ﬂows. When increasing ﬂow to the Dead Sea in a water
scarce region or reallocating water away from agriculture,
return ﬂows do have a use and economic value. Thus, it is
important to quantify and account for them.
The extended model adds a third water quality type, re-
turn ﬂow, to the fresh and recycled water qualities already
included. This addition generates a new mass balance con-
straint in each district i for the new water quality type
qreturn ﬂow:
Water Usei,q =

Local Sourcesi,q + Importsi,q
− Exportsi,q + Reused Wastewateri,q

(1)
·
 
1 − Loss Ratei,q

, ∀ i, q ∈ return ﬂow.
We can then enter data to (i) restrict sectors from using return
ﬂows to satisfy economic demands, and (ii) indicate there
is no leakage or local sources of this quality type. These
conditions reduce Eq. (1) to:
0 =

Importsi,q − Exportsi,q + Reused Wastewateri,q

,(2)
∀ i, q ∈ return ﬂow.
Here, imports, exports, and reused wastewater are the only
active terms in the return ﬂow accounting. The former two
terms are included by specifying conveyance links for return
ﬂows among districts and nodes; in this case, the districts
near or that can deliver return ﬂows to the Jordan Valley and
Dead Sea. The latter term is deﬁned by only allowing the
agriculture sector to contribute wastewater and specifying a
non-consumptive fraction of the original use that becomes
available as the return ﬂow. This deﬁnition mimics an ex-
isting constraint that allows the agricultural sector to reuse
treated wastewater from the urban and industrial sectors (for
return ﬂows, there is no physical wastewater treatment in-
frastructure). I use a non-consumptive fraction of 33% –
as suggested by the literature – and test this assumption by
comparing computed return ﬂows to the lower Jordan River
to observed ﬂows under the existing management regime.
Together, the additional constraint, data entry, and parame-
ter speciﬁcation allow us to include and model returns ﬂows
from agriculture.
3.2 Brine waste from desalination
Brine waste from desalination is also not included in the
single-year and stochastic versions of WAS because the
waste is assumed to have no use nor economic value. How-
ever, brine waste from the Red-Dead project could be de-
livered to Dead Sea and used in lieu of fresh, recycled, or
agricultural return ﬂows to raise the Dead Sea level. In this
situation, which allowing mixing brine waste with other wa-
ter quality types and Dead Sea water, brine waste does have
economic value; it is important to include and quantify these
effects.
We can further modify constraint Eq. (1) to include the
volume of brine waste of water quality type q available at
district i:
Water Usei,q =

Local Sourcesi,q + Importsi,q + Brine Wastei,q
− Exportsi,q + Reused Wastewateri,q

(3)
·
 
1 − Loss Rateiq

, ∀ i, q,
and deﬁne this available volume with a new constraint that
ties the brine waste volume to a user-speciﬁed fractional
amount of the desalinated water produced:
Brine Wastei,q ≤
X
q2∈DQ(q)
 
Brine Fractioni,q2 · (4)
Desalinated Water Producedi,q2

∀ i, q.
Here, the desalinated water produced is one of several terms
embedded in the Local Sources term in Eqs. (1) and (3). The
brine fraction is a unitless ratio that represents the volume of
brine generated for each 1m3 of desalinated water produced.
DQ(q) is a user-speciﬁed set of source water quality types
(q2) that, when desalinated, generate brine quality q. For
simplicity, we can lump brine waste and agricultural return
ﬂows into one water quality type, return ﬂows. Here, use
of brine waste is considered strictly on an additive volume
basis and ignores water quality considerations and concerns
that may arise when mixing Red Sea desalinated brine waste
with Dead Sea water.
Current proposals suggest the Red-Dead project will gen-
erate 1m3 of brine waste for each 1m3 of desalinated water
produced. I use this brine fraction value and also test the
effects of this assumption through sensitivity analysis.
3.3 Multiple water qualities can meet an in-stream ﬂow
requirement
A third extension allows multiple water quality types to, on
average, meet a minimum in-stream ﬂow-requirement. The
single-year WAS model hard-coded a ﬂow requirement to
ensure Israel supplied Gaza with freshwater; Rosenberg et
al. (2008) made the requirement general to allow the user to
specify a minimum required ﬂow for any quality q along any
conveyance link from district i to district j in each stochastic
water availability event e:
Conveyance Flowq,i,j,e ≥ minimum required ﬂowq,i,j, (5)
∀ q, i, j, e.
We can extend this constraint to allow multiple ﬂows of dif-
ferent quality types to count towards the minimum required
ﬂow
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X
q∈Q(i,j)
Conveyance Flowq,i,j,e ≥ minimum (6)
required ﬂowi,j, ∀ i, j, e,
and further, the expected ﬂow to satisfy the minimum ﬂow
requirement rather than in each and every event:
X
e

probabilitye ·
X
q∈Q(i,j)
Conveyance Flowq,i,j,e

 (7)
≥ minimum required ﬂowi,j, ∀ i, j.
In Eqs. (6) and (7), probabilitye is the likelihood that event e
will occur and Q(i,j) is a user-speciﬁed set of water quality
types whose ﬂows can count towards the expected minimum
required ﬂow along the link from i to j. For required deliv-
eries to the Dead Sea, Q(i,j) includes all water quality types
(fresh, recycled, and return ﬂows).
Equation (6) represents an absolute requirement that must
be satisﬁed in every event while Eq. (7) represents a more re-
laxed requirement that need only be satisﬁed on average. The
model user has the choice of which requirement type to ap-
ply on each conveyance link. And, as mentioned previously
in Sect. 3.2, this addition of multiple water quality types to
meet the absolute or expected ﬂow requirement ignores wa-
ter quality considerations and concerns that may arise from
mixing Red Sea desalinated brine waste with Dead Sea wa-
ter.
3.4 Fixed-increment infrastructure expansions
A fourth and ﬁnal extension adds additional constraints and
integer decision variables to limit infrastructure capacity ex-
pansion decisions to ﬁxed increments. Prior work allowed
continuous expansions of desalination, local source, con-
veyance, and wastewater treatment infrastructure up to a
maximum capacity (Rosenberg et al., 2008). That approach
works when proposed expansions are small and/or capital
costs for expansions scale linearly with the expansion size.
However, those assumptions do not hold for large capacity
expansions such as coastal desalination plants or the Red-
Dead project that can only be built in phases, to full capacity,
or not at all.
Here, we can use integer decision variables and constraints
to limit expansions to ﬁxed increments. For expansion of
local sources or desalination facilities, these limits are:
Local Source Expansioni,q = Capacity Intervali,q (8)
· LEVELi,q, ∀ i, q,
where Local Source Expansion is the expansion size
(MCMyr−1) for district i and water quality type q used else-
where in the model, Capacity Interval is the ﬁxed capac-
ity expansion interval associated with each expansion level
(MCMyr−1/level), and LEVEL is an integer variable that
represents the number of expansions implemented and takes
values [0, 1, 2, ...] up to the maximum allowed expan-
sion levels. Equation (8) forces Local Source Expansion to
take step capacities 0, 1×Capacity Interval, 2×Capacity
Interval, ..., Maximum Expansion Level×Capacity Inter-
val. And when a particular capacity expansion project can
only be built to maximum capacity or not built (such as
for the Red-Dead project), LEVEL becomes a binary vari-
able that takes the values [0, 1]. Including these constraints
and decision variables turns the model into a mixed-integer,
non linear program (MINLP) that can be formulated and
solved in the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS)
with ﬁrst CONOPT and then DICOPT (Brooke et al., 1998;
Grossmann et al., 2002). This cascade of solvers starts with
CONOPT for the relaxed mixed-integer, non linear problem
(where interger variables can vary continuously) to ensure
the solution is feasible. Subsequently, DICOPT identiﬁes the
MINLP solution. While DICOPT can not guarantee a global
optimalsolutiontotheMINLP,thecascadeofsolversassures
the relaxed and MINLP solutions are similar. Notation for
the full optimization program, including the objective func-
tion, constraints, and decision variables, is available online
as Supplemental Material.
4 Model data
The extended WAS model uses supply, conveyance, demand,
wastewater treatment, and policy data for Israel, Jordan, and
Palestine collected between 1995 and 2003 (Fisher et al.,
2005) and updated for Jordan in 2006 (Rosenberg et al.,
2008). This section presents updated data for each country,
costs for the Red-Dead project, and describes how the three
countries’ inter-tied water systems are represented.
4.1 Israel
Since 2003, Israel has embarked on an ambitious program
to build seawater desalination plants along its Mediterranean
coast (Dreizin, 2006; Dreizin et al., 2008). Currently,
3 plants in Ashkelon, Palmachim, and Hadera are opera-
tional with a total capacity of 268MCMyr−1. New plants
at Ashdod and Soreq are under construction and should open
in 2012 with additional capacity of 250MCMyr−1. These
plants are modeled with these existing capacities and opera-
tional costs ranging from $0.54 to 0.75m−3. Project tender
amounts serve as the upper bound on capital costs to further
expand these plant capacities towards Israel’s desalination
target of 750MCMyr−1. Capital costs for these expansion
options are included in a scenario that examines new decen-
tralized infrastructure expansions and conservation program
developments.
Israel groundwater availability is represented as constant
from year to year whereas availability of Upper Jordan River
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surface water sources (to the districts of Golan, Hula, and
the Sea of Galilee) are variable with variability characterized
by sorting into increasing order the 60-year record of water
availability to the Sea of Galilee between 1950 and 2010 (Gi-
vati and Rosenfeld, 2007) (availability=stream ﬂow+spring
ﬂows+direct rainfall−evaporation; excludes upstream con-
sumptive use). I partition the distribution of water availabil-
ity into a discrete set of 6 availability events whose mass
probabilities correspond to the mass probabilities used pre-
viously for Jordan (Rosenberg et al., 2008). For each event, I
pull the representative availability value from the sorted dis-
tribution and divide by the mean observed availability over
the 60-year record (443MCMyr−1). This division gives an
event-speciﬁc availability factor and allows use of a single-
set of water availability events for diverse locations in Jor-
dan and Israel that have different probability distributions of
water availability. Finally, we multiply source availabilities
by event- and source-speciﬁc availability factors to estimate
source availability in each event.
A constant groundwater availability precludes modeling
storage or groundwater banking decisions (that may allow
managers to shift water from one water availability event
to another) (Rosenberg et al., 2008). However, the limit
forces use within groundwater safe yield, ensures a long-
term sustainable use of groundwater resources, and counter-
acts the practice of groundwater mining (withdrawing above
the aquifer safe yield), which is common throughout the re-
gion.
4.2 Jordan
Since 2006, Jordan has completed several projects that were
previously under study. The Zara-Ma’een project to desali-
nate brackish-water now delivers 47.5MCMyr−1 to Am-
man. The Zai pumping plant capacity was doubled and can
now convey up to 90MCMyr−1 from Balqa to Amman. An
upgraded Al-Samra waste-water treatment plant can now ac-
commodate up to 97.5MCMyr−1 of municipal and indus-
trial sewage from Amman. This infrastructure is all modeled
with these speciﬁed existing capacities.
In late 2006, Jordan also completed the Unity Dam on
the Yarmouk River. The dam has a total storage capac-
ity of 110MCM and could increase Jordan’s ability to di-
vert Yarmouk water from 128 to 208MCMyr−1. How-
ever, the dam has yet to ﬁll and has stored only a paltry
7 to 30MCMyr−1 (Namrouqa, 2009, 2010). Low storage
is likely due to signiﬁcant upstream abstractions and con-
sumptive use by Syria (Rosenberg, 2006) and has prompted
Jordan to ask Syria to release water to ﬁll the dam (Nam-
rouqa, 2010). Given the dam’s low storage levels and yield
to date, the extended model only allows up to 146MCMyr−1
abstraction from the Yarmouk River as a local supply to Ir-
bid.
Finally, the model keeps water efﬁciency improvements
for urban users, leak reduction programs, Disi aquifer and
conveyance to Amman and Aqaba, wastewater treatment for
Aqaba and Zarqa, and local source developments for Aqaba
as potential water conservation programs and infrastructure
capacity expansions (Rosenberg et al., 2008). These pro-
grams are examined in a scenario that represents new, decen-
tralized infrastructure expansions and conservation program
developments.
4.3 Palestine
Despite difﬁcult political circumstances, there have been no-
table water resources developments in the West Bank and
Gaza since 2003 (Fisher et al., 2005). Two small seawa-
ter desalination plants with capacities of 1.8MCMyr−1 op-
erate in North Gaza and Dier Al-Balah. Wastewater treat-
ment plants operate in the West Bank and Gaza with ca-
pacities that range from, respectively, 0.44 to 8.9 and 15 to
40MCMyr−1. Recent studies by the Palestinian Water Au-
thority (PWA) and others call to expand conveyance, desali-
nation, and wastewater treatment and reuse in Gaza at capi-
tal costs of, respectively, $0.3, $2.7, and $1.2million/MCM.
Although the Palestinian water distribution system has many
leaks, the current analysis assumes PWA will reduce physical
leakage to 20%.
4.4 Red-Dead project
This study locates the Red-Dead project and its conveyance,
desalination, and hydropower generation facilities entirely in
Jordan. It considers two project conﬁgurations and optimisti-
cally estimates capital and operating costs from recent news-
paper reports and ofﬁcial Jordanian statements (Table 1). Ac-
tual costs are likely larger so optimistic estimates provide a
lower-bound basis to determine project feasibility. The ﬁrst
Red-Dead project conﬁguration includes the canal, desalina-
tion at Balqa (near the Dead Sea), delivery of brine waste to
the Dead Sea, conveyance from Balqa to Amman, and rep-
resents the current proposal by Jordan, Israel, and the Pales-
tinians. A second conﬁguration includes only the canal and
hydropower generation at Balqa with tail water delivered to
the Dead Sea. Here, operational costs are negative and rep-
resents proﬁts of approximately $0.05 per kW-h generated
(Hrayshat, 2008, 2009). We test the effect of hydropower
operational cost through sensitivity analysis.
4.5 Inter-tied water system
Representing the Red-Dead project, Dead Sea, and return
ﬂows in a combined, inter-tied model for the three coun-
tries (Fig. 1) required several modiﬁcations. First, new nodes
were added for the lower Jordan River and Dead Sea. Sec-
ond, new links for all qualities at zero operational cost were
speciﬁed from (a) Biqaat Kinerrot and Beit Shean (in Israel),
(b) Irbid and Balqa (in Jordan), and (c) Jenin and Jericho (in
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Table 1. Capital and Operating Costs Used to Model Red-Dead Project Conﬁgurations.
Conﬁguration Capital Cost Operating Cost Ref.
($USbillion) ($m−3)
Canal, desalination, Amman conveyance, 4.1 1.14 (Hussein, 2007)
and brine waste delivery to the Dead Sea
Canal and desalination 2.6 0.92 (H. El-Nasser, personal
communication, 2005)
Amman conveyance 1.5 0.22 (Fisher et al., 2005;
H. El-Nasser, personal
communication, 2005)
Canal, hydropower, and tail water 1.5 −0.05 (Hrayshat, 2008, 2009)
delivery to the Dead Sea
Palestine) to the lower Jordan River node, and (d) the Jordan
RivertotheDeadSea. Third, additionallinksforreturnﬂows
at no operational cost were also added from West (Israel) to
East Jerusalem (Palestine) and from East Jerusalem (Pales-
tine) to Jericho (Palestine). These links all represent con-
veyance by gravity ﬂow through existing wadis and channels
to the Jordan River and Dead Sea. The new expected min-
imum ﬂow requirement presented in Sect. 3.3 was speciﬁed
along the last link from the Jordan River to the Dead Sea and
used to make the hydro-economic analysis.
5 Hydro-economic model results
I ran the extended model for a base case representing ex-
isting infrastructure, demands forecast in 2020, fresh and
recycled water use, and a Dead Sea ﬂow requirement of
100MCMyr−1 (A1 in Fig. 2). Scenario analysis shows im-
pacts when considering agricultural return ﬂows (A2 and
A3), return ﬂows with two Red-Dead project conﬁgurations
(B and C) and with new decentralized water infrastructure
plus conservation programs (Figs. 2 to 5 and Table 2). Sen-
sitivity analysis shows how scenario net beneﬁts and alloca-
tions change when increasing the expected required ﬂow to
the Dead Sea – the environmental water use constraint at-
tached to the lower Jordan River conveyance link.
System-wide expected net beneﬁts fall and expected costs
rise as the required ﬂow to the Dead Sea increases (Fig. 2).
Rising expected costs reﬂect increasing water scarcity and
reduced beneﬁts as water is reallocated from agricultural, ur-
ban, and industrial water users to the lower Jordan River and
Dead Sea. When the existing system (A1, using only fresh
and recycled waters) returns approximately 900MCMyr−1
to the Dead Sea, cost increases surpass a $US726 mil-
lionyr−1 benchmark that represent the non-market bene-
ﬁts from restoration measured by prior estimates of Is-
raeli, Palestinian, and Jordanian willingness-to-pay (WTP)
to restore the Dead Sea (Becker and Katz, 2009). These
non-market WTP beneﬁts include gross proﬁts from Dead
Sea mineral extractions, contigent value stated, and travel
cost revealed preferences. These WTP beneﬁts are not in-
cluded in the extended model, but represent a benchmark
against which to compare expected decreases in net bene-
ﬁts when a 900MCMyr−1 threshold ﬂow is achieved that
hydrologists and limnologists advise is needed to stabilize
the Dead Sea level at −435m (Yechieli et al., 1998). Model
results suggest the existing system (A1) can ﬂexibly reallo-
cate and deliver additional water to the Dead Sea but cannot
economically meet the 900MCMyr−1 ﬂow threshold.
Agricultural return ﬂows (A2 and A3 in Fig. 2) serve an
important economic role to reach downstream environmen-
tal objectives. Namely, decreasing the water consumptively
used by agricultural and returning larger ﬂows to the lower
Jordan River reduces overall expected costs. Still, these cost
reductions are not sufﬁciently large to make achieving the
900MCMyr−1 Dead Sea ﬂow threshold economical.
Expected costs associated with the Red-Dead project (B,
conﬁgured to desalinate new supply and deliver brine waste
to the Dead Sea as currently proposed by Jordan, Israel,
and the Palestinians) are lower than the reallocation alter-
natives and the WTP benchmark. Interestingly, the pro-
gram only ﬁnds beneﬁt to build and operate the Red-Dead
project when the Jordan River ﬂow requirement is at or above
800MCMyr−1. However, expected costs are lower still for
a smaller Red-Dead project conﬁguration (C) that only gen-
erates hydropower and delivers tail water to the Dead Sea
or alternative (D) that builds new, decentralized local infras-
tructureandconservationprogramsacrossthethreecountries
(Fig. 2). These alternatives are more economically viable
than the Red-Dead project currently proposed by the three
countries.
A sensitivity analysis shows the agricultural return ﬂow
and brine generation conditions for which it is viable to build
the Red-Dead project (B) as proposed by the three countries
(Fig. 3). Increasing agricultural return ﬂows delay the need
for the project and allow the existing system to meet larger
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Table 2. Price schedule for Dead Sea water purchases under different infrastructure and program alternatives using WAS model shadow
value results ($US per m3).
Water volume A2. Existing B. Red-Dead C. Red-Dead D. New local
remaining to be system with project, project, infrastructure and
delivered in the year agriculture return desalination and hydropower and water
(MCM) ﬂows (33%) brine waste tail water delivery conservation
delivery programs
100 0 0 0 0
200 0 0 0 0
300 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.09
400 0.43 0.43 0 0.27
500 0.53 0.53 0 0.45
600 0.67 0.67 0 0.53
700 0.86 0.86 0 0.63
800 1.65 1.65 0 0.88
900 6.26 0.46 0 0.88
1000 35.59 0.46 0 1.12
Fig. 2. Economic impacts for six restoration alternatives when in-
creasing required ﬂow to the Dead Sea. Change on the y-axis is
quantiﬁed as expected net beneﬁts observed for the base case alter-
native A1 that allows reallocations, uses only fresh+recycled wa-
ter, and delivers just 100MCMyr−1 ﬂow to the Dead Sea minus
expected net beneﬁts for the speciﬁed alternative at the speciﬁed
Dead Sea ﬂow requirement.
Dead Sea ﬂow requirements with lower expected costs. In
contrast, larger brine fractions that produce more brine vol-
ume for each 1m3 of desalinated freshwater provide an in-
centive to build the project earlier at smaller required ﬂows
to the Dead Sea. This result occurs because larger brine frac-
tions provide more brine water to meet the Dead Sea ﬂow
requirement. Expected costs are the same up until the points
where the project is built; at larger required ﬂows to the Dead
Sea where the project is built, larger brine fractions lower
overall expected costs to meet the required ﬂow. These sen-
sitivity results highlight needs to consider agricultural return
ﬂows, brine generation, and other environmental water in-
puts when determining new infrastructure and operations to
meet downstream environmental ﬂow requirements.
The three viable restoration alternatives identiﬁed in Fig. 2
distribute beneﬁts and desalination responsibilities differ-
ently among the three countries (Fig. 4). Jordan principally
bears costs to operate the Red-Dead project and satisfy larger
Dead Sea ﬂow requirements whiles Israel cuts back some
Mediterranean coastal desalination (B). With a smaller Red-
Dead project that just generates hydropower (C), Jordan still
exclusively bears the project costs. Costs, beneﬁts, and de-
salination responsibilities switch with a decentralized mix
of new local infrastructure and conservation programs (D).
Initially, Israel cuts back coastal desalination while expected
beneﬁts accrue mostly to Jordan. However, as required ﬂows
to the Dead Sea increase, Israel increases coastal desalina-
tion and faces increased expected costs. When considering
an estimated split in WTP beneﬁts from Dead Sea restoration
among Israel, Jordan, and Palestine of $363, $339, and $23
millionyr−1, respectively (Becker and Katz, 2009), only the
smaller Red-Dead project that just generates hydropower (C)
will produce sufﬁcient individual beneﬁts for each country.
6 Implications for governance
For all alternatives, expected costs rise as the required ﬂow
to the Dead Sea increases (Figs. 2 to 4). Increases reﬂect in-
creasing water scarcity and show each country currently has
little or no individual economic incentive to deliver water to
the Dead Sea. Absent a requirement, countries would rather
put water to beneﬁcial use and have other countries return
water to the Dead Sea. This incentive structure contributed
to the current full use of Jordan River water and will likely
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Fig. 3. Sensitivity analysis shows how the decision to build the Red-Dead project (I. left panels) and change in expected costs (II. right
panels) are inﬂuenced by agricultural return ﬂows (y-axes), the brine generation ratio (panel rows), and required ﬂows to the Dead Sea
(x-axes). Changes in expected costs (II. right panels) are deﬁned as in Fig. 2. The brine generation ratio is the m3 of brine waste generated
for each 1m3 of desalinated freshwater produced. Dashed blue lines indicate default agricultural return ﬂow and brine generation parameter
values used elsewhere to evaluate Red-Dead project options B and C.
continue should new infrastructure like a Red-Dead project
be built.
New infrastructure alone will not raise the Dead Sea level.
Third parties and institutions outside the basin – such as the
World Bank or environmental groups – that seek to raise
the Dead Sea level must also create incentives for coun-
tries to deliver water to the Dead Sea. First, outside in-
stitutions could offer countries ﬁnancial incentives such as
pay the full capital cost of the Red-Dead project (annualized
at $US330millionyr−1, 5% interest, continuous compound-
ing, 20-year project life) to encourage the countries to agree
on the water volumes each will deliver to the Dead Sea. Yet
even with this incentive, a decentralized mix of new local
infrastructure and conservation programs is still a more eco-
nomically viable alternative to raise the Dead Sea level.
6.1 Pay countries to deliver water to the Dead Sea
Alternatively, outside institutions could pay countries to de-
liver water to the Dead Sea. Model results show that the
scarcity value of water is large (Table 2). This scaricty value
is the shadow value (Lagrange multiplier) associated with
the minimum in-stream ﬂow constraint and describes the
decrease in overall net beneﬁts were the ﬂow requirement
raised one unit. Shadow values have units of $/m3 and de-
scribe the minimum price a country would require to forgo
use of the water and allow the water to ﬂow to the Jordan
river. Generally, shadow values rise as the Jordan River ﬂow
requirement increases and water becomes more scarce (Ta-
ble 2). Exceptions occur (Table 2, columns B and C) when
increased ﬂow requirements trigger new large infrastructure
projects that have substantial capital costs but are not imme-
diately operated at full capacity. After the projects are built
and as the ﬂow requirement further increases, the shadow
value reﬂects the operational cost to bring online unused ca-
pacity. However, in all cases, shadow values are positive and
large so countries will prefer to beneﬁcially use the water
rather than deliver it to the Jordan River and Dead Sea.
Anoutsideinstitutioncouldpurchasewaterfromthecoun-
tries with purchases occurring only when purchase prices
(i) exceed the scarcity (and other) costs borne by users in
the country selling the water, but are (ii) less than the envi-
ronmental value of water returned to the Dead Sea. There
are several common objections to market-based water pur-
chases (Richards and Singh, 2001) and responses (Fisher and
Huber-Lee, 2009; Fisher et al., 2005). Here, I address issues
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Fig. 4. Country-speciﬁc impacts for three more-promising restoration alternatives (B, C, and D). Desalination volumes (top panels) are
desalination operations during the most extreme water availability event when surface water ﬂows in Jordan and the Upper Jordan River are,
respectively, 48% and 44% of their historical averages. Changes in expected costs (bottom panels) are deﬁned as in Fig. 2.
to purchase water for environmental purposes (Murphy et
al., 2009). First, the most effective market will involve a
grand coalition of all countries (although one or more coun-
tries may only nominally participate) (Fisher and Huber-Lee,
2009). Second, no countries may choose to sell. Although,
at some (possibly large) price, a country will ﬁnd the pay-
ment sufﬁcient compensation for the scarcity costs it incurs
and sell water. Third, countries could collude to raise prices.
While possible, collusion will likely be temporary. As offer
prices rise, a country will have a strong incentive to defect
and sell. Fourth, the sale price need not stay constant and
can vary with environmental, hydrological, and other condi-
tions such as the water volume already purchased.
Settingappropriatesalepricesiskeytoestablishasuccess-
ful market for environmental purchases. And WAS model
shadow values for water to meet the Dead Sea ﬂow constraint
(Table 2) can help guide price setting (Fisher and Huber-Lee,
2009; Fisher et al., 2005). These shadow values represent
the scarcity value of water and minimum price an outside
institution must offer to successfully purchase water from a
country. A regressive schedule based on shadow value model
results(Table2)couldsetpricesatorabovetheshadowvalue
associated with the delivery volume still remaining to meet
the annual target.
The present values of annual payments to countries to
deliver water to the Dead Sea are large and typically ex-
ceed capital costs for new infrastructure (Fig. 5). Payments
and capital costs under the existing system (A2) exceed the
estimated $US8.9billion present value of the annual WTP
benchmark that represents beneﬁts to restore the Dead Sea
(20 year life, 5% interest, continuous compounding). Lower
payments and capital costs for the Red-Dead project pro-
posed by the three countries (B) and decentralized mix of
new local infrastructure and conservation programs (D) are
at or slightly below the WTP benchmark. Costs are lowest
for the smaller Red-Dead project conﬁgured to only gener-
ate hydropower (C) and are principally to build new infras-
tructure (canal, turbines, and generators). Here, payments
are needed only to purchase ﬂows up to 300MCMyr−1 be-
fore the project is built. Above this level, Jordan builds and
proﬁtably generates hydropower at full capacity, the Dead
Sea ﬂow constraint does not bind, and the associated shadow
value is zero. Although payments to countries signiﬁcantly
raise costs to return ﬂows to the Dead Sea, WTP beneﬁts
fromrestorationoftensurpassthepaymentsandcapitalcosts.
6.2 Hydropower operating cost sensitivity analysis
Results in Figs. 4 and 5 suggest the Red-Dead project op-
erated only to generate hydropower and deliver tail water to
the Dead Sea is the most economically viable of the alterna-
tives considered. Namely, present value costs for new infras-
tructure plus payments to countries to deliver water are sub-
stantially below the estimated present value of WTP beneﬁts
from restoration. Yet this viability is sensitive to the Red-
Dead project hydropower operating cost (Fig. 6). Should ei-
ther the sale price for generated energy fall or we include
project operations and maintenance costs, Jordan would still
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Fig. 5. Present value costs for each alternative including capital costs for new infrastructure and programs and payments to countries to
deliver the speciﬁed ﬂow to the Dead Sea. Payments to countries are based on the shadow value price schedule in Table 2. Payments are
compared to the present value of an annual WTP benchmark estimated by Becker and Katz (2009) that represents beneﬁts to restore the Dead
Sea.
build the Red-Dead project, but operate the project at less
than capacity and only to meet the Dead Sea ﬂow require-
ment. There would be a shadow value associated with de-
livering water to the Dead Sea and Jordan would likely seek
annual payments to deliver the water to the Dead Sea. The
present value of these payments would comprise several bil-
lion dollars and approach payments associated with other
Dead Sea restoration alternatives. These results suggest the
economic viability of a smaller Red-Dead project that only
generates hydropower is sensitive to the sale price of gen-
erated electricity, operations and maintenance costs; these
project aspects require further study.
6.3 Limitations
The hydro-economic model is a steady-state model that rep-
resents a long-run, future equilibrium. Results focus on the
end state but do not describe the dynamic transition from
the current to future state (such as when new infrastructure
should be built or payments started). Additionally, recom-
mended solutions, on average, deliver water to the lower Jor-
dan River to meet an expected-value in-stream ﬂow condi-
tion, butdosobybothsurpassingandnotreachingtheannual
target in years with, respectively, high and low (surface) wa-
ter availability. Still, deliveries in low availability years far
surpass the current paltry 100MCMyr−1 Jordan River ﬂow
to the Dead Sea. Such ﬂow variations above and below the
required ﬂow are acceptable for resilient environmental sys-
tems – such as the lower Jordan River and Dead Sea – where
restoration objectives are largely hydrologic and/or systems
do notface (or havealready surpassed) ecological thresholds.
For threatened systems that face thresholds beyond which re-
coveryisnotpossible, absoluteminimumﬂowcriteriashould
instead be implemented. In the Jordan River basin, were an
absolute ﬂow criteria instead used, model results (not shown)
indicate a much larger need for desalination, higher shadow
values, and larger payments to countries to deliver water to
the Jordan River.
Model results and implications for governance also do not
consider the environmental effects of mixing Red- and Dead
Sea waters, adding brine waste from desalinated Red Sea wa-
ter to Dead Sea water, or locating a large project intake facil-
ityat the north end ofthe RedSea inthe Eilat/Aqabaenviron-
mental and tourist zone. Currently, the World Bank is iden-
tifying effects and remediation strategies and quantifying re-
mediation costs. Still, even with small remediation costs,
model results show other alternatives are more economically
viable than the Red-Dead project currently proposed by the
three countries. Further, remediation costs would exacerbate
existing governance that encourages full use of Jordan River
water and make it more difﬁcult for countries to deliver water
to the Dead Sea via the Red-Dead project.
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Fig. 6. Present value costs as a function of both the ﬂow delivered to the Dead Sea and the hydropower operational cost for the Red-Dead
project conﬁguration that considers only the canal, hydropower generation, and tailwater delivery to the Dead Sea. Hydropower operation
costs less than zero represent operational beneﬁts.
7 Conclusions
A declining Dead Sea level and the associated land subsi-
dence, sink holes, groundwater contamination, reduced min-
eralextractionandtourism, plusotherproblems, inpart, have
prompted Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians to propose the
Red-Dead project to raise the Dead Sea level. The project
would build a large, expensive canal from the Red Sea to the
Dead Sea and also generate hydropower and desalinated wa-
ter.
Hydro-economic model results for the three countries’
inter-tied water systems show two Dead Sea restoration al-
ternatives – a (i) mix of decentralized new infrastructure and
conservation programs in each country, or (ii) smaller Red-
Dead project that only generates hydropower – are more eco-
nomically viable than the larger Red-Dead project proposed
by the three countries. These assessments consider important
components of ﬂow balance for the Dead Sea, ﬂow require-
ments to restore the Dead Sea level, and limits to build large
infrastructure such as the Red-Dead project. Flow balance
components such as agricultural return ﬂows and brine waste
generation inﬂuence the conditions in which new infrastruc-
ture (such as the Red-Dead project) should be built and over-
all expected costs to meet downstream environmental ﬂow
requirements.
Results for all restoration alternatives show rising deliv-
eries to the Dead Sea trigger increasing water scarcity and
suggest each country has little individual incentive to allow
water to ﬂow to the Dead Sea. Beyond new infrastructure,
outside institutions that seek to raise the Dead must also de-
velop new governance that provides countries incentives to
deliver water to the Dead Sea. One incentive – pay coun-
tries to deliver water – ties environmental water purchases to
model shadow value results and the scarcity value of water.
Payments will substantially raise actual Dead Sea restoration
costs above the current estimated $US5billion capital costs
for the Red-Dead project. Payments for water and new in-
frastructure will also change the distribution of water, bene-
ﬁts, and costs among the three countries. Although payments
are large, restoration beneﬁts measured by willingness-to-
pay estimates are larger still and identify several viable ap-
proaches to raise the Dead beyond the Red-Dead project pro-
posed by the three countries.
Supplementary material related to this
article is available online at:
http://www.hydrol-earth-syst-sci.net/15/1243/2011/
hess-15-1243-2011-supplement.pdf.
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